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Abstract: 
By constructing a novel measure on the frequency of changes in social protection policies, we provide 
preliminary, yet new evidence on the determinants of social security reforms in Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) countries. This fills a gap in literature where analyses of MENA social policies have 
been lacking due to limited data.  
Using panel data for seventeen countries from 1961 to 2015, we estimate RE Poisson regression 
models. Our results indicate that growth in national income and the frequency of social reform in 
MENA countries are related, first positively for low growth rates, then negatively for high growth 
rates. This finding is completed by the negative effects of oil production and of the population size on 
the number of social reforms. 
Among the avenues of interpretation we examined - investment model, social objectives pursued by the 
government, and socio-political equilibrium - this is the first one which seems to be better able to fit 
our results, accompanied by political disturbances. 
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1. Introduction 
 Social protection pertains to mechanisms which aid in the prevention, 
management, and curbing out of situations that hurt welfare (UNRISD, 2010). It 
concerns policies that reduce people’s exposure to socioeconomic risks like 
unemployment, sickness, and old age (Midgley, 2013). Common types of social 
protection include labor market interventions, such as employment services and job 
training; social insurance schemes, such as health or unemployment insurance; and 
social assistance programs which provide monetary or in-kind transfers, like food 
stamps to vulnerable individuals (e.g., the homeless and the physically challenged). 
 Countries invest in social protection programs to gain benefits from human 
capital development and income-generating activities (World Bank, 2015).  This 
paper conjectures three causes as to whether or not countries will reform social 
programs. First, a new social reform may be deemed to be an investment that will 
generate future productive gains, either through human capital accumulation, increase 
in available labor force, or other channels. Second, social reforms may be the 
consequence of explicit or implicit social objectives of the government. For example, 
a socialist government may aim at providing social protection to the people as a direct 
consequent of its ideological orientation. Finally, a social reform can emerge from a 
political equilibrium. For example, destitute social classes may be more in favor of 
redistribution and social assistance, while well-off citizens may oppose it. If social 
policy is decided through a vote process, this may lead to new progressive social 
reforms when the lower classes dominate the electorate. However, if instead wealthy 
classes dominate, they may also trigger social reforms, for example in order to cut 
social costs. For example, Hassler et al. (2003) propose a politico-economic model 
with repeated voting about distortionary income redistribution, in which the 
constituency of redistributive policies depends on redistribution itself. Such 
equilibrium may also involve traditional features of society, such as in Dahl et al. 
(2014) who show how family welfare cultures may be inherited and generate raising 
long-term participation in social programs. 
However, most existing empirical evidence on these issues analyzes trends in 
social security expenditures in industrialized countries, especially in western Europe 
(Gordon, 1988). Many studies also investigate the effects of social programs on labor 
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force behavior, productivity and other economic outcomes2. In contrast, few are the 
authors who investigate the determinants of the emergence of social programs. Led by 
early research by Aaron (1967) and Wilensky (1975), disparities in social protection 
programs are usually attributed to differences in national income, demography, and 
government type. Indeed, demography matters for example for the funding of 
pensions programs since young generations have often to pay for old generations’ 
pensions. Political and cultural dynamics may also play a role. For example, Wilensky 
(1981) observed in western Europe that the growth in the number of Catholic workers 
led to the expansion of social security programs.  In general, Rudra (2015) discusses 
how politics plays into the debate about social protection in developing countries. For 
example, in Scandinavia, an explanation for the generous social security spending in 
these countries is the participation in government of Social Democratic parties 
(Gordon, 1988). 
However, to date, there is a lack of analysis on social welfare systems in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. This can be attributed to limited 
availability of indicators on social programs for most countries (see Silva et al, 2012; 
Jawad 2008 and 2009; UNDP, 2011, for qualitative case studies). Furthermore, unlike 
most Western countries, some MENA countries have oil-dependent economies. When 
they exist, these oil resources have been used to finance social programs to an extent 
which would not have been possible without them. This may imply a certain 
inclination in favor of social assistance, as a reflection of traditional social concerns in 
al Koran. Finally, note that many of these countries have experienced little changes in 
political structures over the period under study, which may explain why typical 
political economy variables may have little explanatory power in this context.  
This note explores potential causes for social policy reforms in the MENA 
region. More specifically, we focus on an empirical investigation of factors correlated 
with the incidence of social protection reforms. Because of shortage of data on 
welfare expenditures (i.e., the kind of data that past social security studies on 
developed countries utilize), we first construct a new measure of the frequency of 
changes in social protection programs in these countries. This is performed using 
country reports from the International Social Security Association (ISSA, 2015), 
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which provide the dates when a social program has been created or modified. Using 
these variables, for a panel data of seventeen MENA countries from 1961 to 2015, we 
estimate RE Poisson regression models of the number of social reforms.  
Our main results show that, on the one hand, income growth is positively 
correlated with the number of reforms for low growth rates, and negatively correlated 
for higher growth. On the other hand, reliance on oil use and the level of population 
are found to be negatively associated with the number of social reforms. 
The remaining sections of the paper are structured as follows. Section 2 
describes the data. Section 3 discusses the econometric findings. Finally, Section 4 
concludes. 
2. The Data 
 This study uses panel data from 1961 to 2015 and seventeen MENA countries. 
The number	 of	MENA	 countries	 included	 in	 this	 analysis	 is	 constrained	by	 the	
available	country	reports	from	the	International Social Security Association (ISSA, 
2015).	The	following	countries	are	considered:	Algeria,	Bahrain,	Egypt,	Iran,	Iraq,	
Israel,	 Jordan,	 Kuwait,	 Lebanon,	 Libya,	 Morocco,	 Oman,	 Qatar,	 Saudi	 Arabia,	
Syria,	Tunisia,	and	Yemen.  
What does determine the occurrence of social policy reforms in the MENA 
region? To provide preliminary insights to this question, we first construct a new 
measure of the number of social protection reforms in each country-period, by using 
qualitative data from the ISSA (2015). Variable ‘NR’ denotes the result of this count, 
which is the number of reforms in social security policies for each five-year period 
between 1961 and 2016.  This was possible thanks to ISSA reports for each MENA 
country that indicate the year when its first social security-related law is ratified, as 
well as the dates of subsequent reforms, if any.  As found in ISSA, five categories of 
social protection programs are considered: 1) pensions, dependents, and disability 
benefits, 2) sickness and maternity benefits; 3) work injury and health benefits, 4) 
unemployment compensation, and 5) family allowances. Descriptive statistics in 
Table 1 show that, for any five-year period, the number of new social policy reforms 
range from 0 to 4, with a mean of about one half by country-year, which amounts to 
six reforms per country on average. 
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 Several socioeconomic explanatory variables are considered as potential 
determinants of NR. Using data from the World Development Indicators of the World 
Bank Group (WDI, 2015), ‘Growth’, ‘Energy’, and ‘Population’ are constructed using 
five-year averages from 1961 to 2015 for each country, which corresponds to eleven 
periods.  
The	covariate	‘Growth’ is defined as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of a 
given country. To account for nonlinearities, we also introduce the square of this 
variable, (Growth)2. Variable ‘Population’ is defined as the logarithm of the five-year 
average of a country’s total population. Meanwhile, variable ‘Oil’ is constructed by 
taking the logarithm of the five-year average energy use (in kilograms of oil 
equivalent) per capita. It may be seens as a proxy for consumption-related oil 
subsidies. Indeed, this variable is included because MENA governments may consider 
transfers financed from oil revenues as substitutes to social assistance programs. More 
specifically, if it were not oil-related transfers, social protection programs would 
account for less than 1% of GDP in the MENA region. This crowding out effect was 
observed by Silva (2012). In the MENA region, consumption-focused food subsidies 
and fuel subsidies are popular social policy instruments. Beyond their huge budgetary 
cost, they have other serious shortcomings: they do not lead to investment in human 
capital, they distort prices, and finally their targeting performance of the poor is 
mediocre.  
To account for the relative lack of political transitions in MENA countries, 
two additional explanatory variables are utilized to characterize between-country 
differences in governance systems. First, variable ‘Islamicgovt’ is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the country is governed by an Islamic constitution. Out of the 
seventeen countries, three countries have constitutions based on Islam: Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, and Yemen. The relationship of Islamicgovt to the number of reforms seems 
to be a priori ambiguous. On one hand, a constitution deeply rooted in Islamic 
traditions may signal rigidity in modifying the legal and constitutional setting. In that 
case, social security reforms may be less likely to occur. On the other hand, a religion-
based government may favor of social protection, as related to traditional Muslim 
obligations, and thereby make social reforms more likely. 
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Second, ‘Law1961’ is a dummy binary variable identifying whether social 
protection programs were created or modified before 1961 (the start date of the 
sample). Of the seventeen sampled countries, seven did not have any social security 
program before 1961: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 
Yemen. This controls for the partly unobserved history of social reforms, before the 
starting date of our data, year 1961. Given the perceived stability in the constitution of 
most MENA countries, having experienced social reforms before 1961 may imply 
fewer needs of social reforms after this date. On the other hand, because of fixed 
organizational costs, changes in social policies can be easier to implement if the 
country has already an existing program (Gordon, 1988).  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the above-mentioned variables. Per 
5-years period, the observed number of new reforms ranges from zero to four, with 
about one new reform every ten years. A standard deviation about one shows the 
considerable heterogeneity of these new programs across periods and countries. The 
mean growth (from 5-year averages) is slightly higher in this sample than 5 percent, 
with a coefficient of variation over 1, showing substantial growth volatility and 
heterogeneity. Only 17 percent of the country-years took place under Islamic 
government. Finally, 59 percent of observations correspond to a country with social 
programs before 1981. 
 
Table 1 : Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
name 
Number 
observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Nb reforms  187 0.54 1.01 0 4 
Growth 147 5.51 5.82 -7.95 43.15 
Oil 153 7.31 1.23 4.75 9.95 
Population 187 15.59 1.52 11.03 18.27 
IslamicGovt 187 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Law1961 187 0.58 0.49 0 1 
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3. Empirical Results 
  
Table 2 shows our estimates of the random-effect panel Poisson regression of 
the number reforms. In this model, the unobserved heterogeneity of countries is 
modeled according to a Gamma distribution. The small sample of country-period 
observations constrains us to include only a few covariates, and invites us to duscuss 
significance up to the 10 percent level. 
 
Table 2 : Random-effects Poisson panel regression of the number of reforms 
Independent variable (1) 
Coefficient
(s.e.) 
(2) 
Coefficient
(s.e.) 
Growth 0.0452* 
(0.0264) 
0.1804** 
(0.0803) 
(Growth)2  -0.0088* 
(0.0047) 
Oil -0.2731* 
(0.1475) 
-0.2564* 
(0.1472) 
Population -0.3459* 
(0.2099) 
-0.3625* 
(0.2147) 
Islamicgovt 0.6329 
(0.5247) 
0.6994 
(0.5217) 
Law1961 0.6099 
(0.4742) 
0.5883 
(0.4651) 
Constant 6.3186* 
(3.7266) 
6.129 
(3.8556) 
Number of observations 131 
Number of groups 17 
Average observation per group 7 
Log-likelihood -151.58         -149.52 
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In column (1), economic growth is found to have a linear, slightly positive, 
effect on the number of reforms. The faster a country’s income grows, the more the 
country may afford new social policies. This is consistent with citizens’ expectations 
and aspirations for reform rising with the prosperity in the economy. However, when 
a squared growth term is included in the regression, a decreasing return to growth 
appears, as exhibited by the negative and significant coefficient of (Growth)2. Beyond 
a growth threshold equal to 1.025 percent per year, the positive effect of growth 
vanishes and instead becomes negative. It may be that when a country’s income 
growth rate is high enough, the social needs of the population can be better fulfilled 
by income hikes than by costly new social programs. This is consistent with findings 
that the rate of return of capital typically exceeds the relatively low rate of return on 
the social security taxes paid by working generations (Felstein and Liebman, 2001). 
Following on our three conjectures stated in the Introduction, the non-linear impact of 
Growth does not fit clearly with interpreting social reforms seen as social objectives 
or arising from a political equilibrium. It can be argued that it may better reflect social 
programs seen as investment exhibiting decreasing returns to scale.  
Meanwhile, the coefficient of variable Population is significantly and 
negatively correlated with the number of social reforms. This is consistent with 
making changes in social programs with a larger population corresponding to higher 
investment costs. One may also argue that policy reforms may be harder to implement 
with large populations due to coordination problems. 
The Oil variable, too, has a significant negative effect on the frequency of 
social security reforms. This is in line with the Rentier state model (Ross, 2004) 
stating that the more reliant is the economy to oil, the less likely is the government to 
spend on long-term welfare programs. Another related explanation is found in the 
recent literature on the resource curse (Van der Ploeg, 2011). It hypothesizes that 
countries dependent on natural resources, like petroleum and minerals, are 
characterized by inefficient institutions (Mehlum et al, 2006; Torvik, 2009) and hence 
have short-sighted policies which tend to under-provide public goods (Van der Ploeg 
and Poelhekke, 2010). Under our interpretation grid, the impact of the Oil variable 
may be regarded as an outcome of a subjacent political equilibrium.  
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Finally, as for other variables controlling for the political environment and not 
included, Islamicgovt and Law1961 are both found not to significantly affect the 
number of reforms. This rules out exaggerating the roles of historical trends and 
religious orientation in determining social policies in MENA countries. 
 
4. Conclusion 
By constructing a novel measure on the frequency of changes in social 
protection policies, this empirical paper provides preliminary, yet new evidence on 
the determinants of social security reforms in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
countries. This fills a gap in literature where analysis of MENA social policies has 
been lacking because of limited data on social expenditures in these countries. Unlike 
most literature focusing on industrialized Western countries, what makes the MENA 
region different, beyond lower development level, is first that many of these countries 
are reliant on oil wealth, and second, that they enjoy relatively stable political 
systems, until recently with the occurrence of the Arab Spring. Using panel data for 
seventeen countries from 1961 to 2015, we estimate RE Poisson regression models. 
Our results indicate that growth in national income and the number of social reforms 
in MENA countries are related, first positively for low growth rates, then negatively 
for high growth rates. This finding is completed by negative effects of oil production 
and of the population size on the number of social reforms. 
Among the avenues of interpretation we examined - investment model, social 
objectives pursued by the government, and socio-political equilibrium - this is the first 
one which seems to be better able to fit these results. Indeed, investment may imply 
both decreasing returns to scale and rising population costs for the development of 
social programs. However, the complexity of the social and political processes in 
MENA social policies may be consistent with the negative correlation with oil 
proudction. For example, MENA governments, which are dominated by elites more 
concerned by their staying in power and rent seeking than long-term human capital 
investment and human capital protection strategies, may directly buy the support of 
populations through direct transfers or subsidies when they can finance them from oil 
resources. 
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Finally, there are several directions in which this paper could be extended. 
First, more detailed data on social programs should be constructed. Second, one may 
want to move from the analysis of the incidence of policies towards the analysis of 
outcomes. That is: do the nonlinear effects of oil production specialization or income 
growth remain when examining the impact of social programs on some of their 
outcomes, like women employment, coverage of health insurance, and retirement 
rates? Third, the scope of studied countries could be expanded. Doing so would 
provide more comprehensive investigation on the disparities between the frequencies 
of social policy reform in MENA and non-MENA countries, although larger 
unobserved heterogeneities of countries may raise new challenges. 
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